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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES IN THE 1980's 
A. The Problem 
Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. 1 
• Professor of Law, Tuebingen University, and Judge at the Court of Appeals, Stuttgart, 
Germany. M.C.J. 1966, New York University; Dr. jur. 1967, Munich University; Dr. phi!. 
1968, Tuebingen University. - Ed. 
I. On developments during the first half of the nineteenth century, see Hopt, /dee/le und 
wirlschaflliche Grundlagen der Aktien-, Bank- und Borsenrechtsentwicklung im 19. Jahrl1undert, 
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Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prus-
sia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already 
been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influ-
ence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors 
and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially 
when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management; 
and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by 
monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public 
opinion and govemment.2 
Today these features of the "modem" corporation - separation of own-
ership and control; the lack of "personal" responsibility vis-a-vis creditors 
and the public, who bear the consequences of corporate decisions and cor-
porate failure; and the ubiquitous presence of corporate power in what has 
been called a "corporate society" - have been examined from both a theo-
retical and an empirical viewpoint in the United States as well as in Eu-
rope. 3 Yet, in spite of an endless number of reform proposals and a good 
number of actual corporate law reforms,4 the problem of corporate gover-
nance remains acute. Indeed, the development of more complex corporate 
structures, such as groups of companies,5 and the appearance of transna-
tional enterprises6 has exacerbated the problem. Legislators and courts in 
in 5 WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION DES PRIVATRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT: GELD 
UND BANKEN 128 (H. Coing & W. Wilhelm eds. 1980). On the period between 1860 and 1920, 
see Hom, Aktienrechtliche Unternehmensorganisation in der Hochindustrialisierung (1860-1920). 
Deutsch/and, England, Frankreich und die USA im Vergleich, in RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG 
DER GROSSUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND FRUHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT 123 (N. Hom & J. Kocka 
eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as N. Hom & J. Kocka] (German with English su=ary). 
2. See lnstruktion, die Grundsiitze in Ansehung der Konzessionierung von Aktiengesell-
schaflen betre.ffend, vom 22.4.1845, 1845 MINISTERIAL-BLATT FUR DIE GESAMTE INNERE 
VERWALTUNG IN DEN KONIGLICH PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN 121 (concerning the practice 
under the Prussian Corporation Act of 1843); R. von Mohl, Die Aktiengese!lscheften, 
volkswirtschafllich und politisch betrachtet, 1856 DEUTSCHE VIERTEUAHRS-SCHRIFT pt. 4, at 1, 
38, 52. 
3. See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932); L. GOWER, J. CRONIN, A. EASON & LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON, PRINCI-
PLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 49-57, 494-95 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as L. GOWER]; 
E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981); E. MESTMACKER, VERWAL-
TUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND RECHTE DER AKTIONARE 78-89 (1958); R. WIETHOLTER, IN-
TERESSEN UND ORGANISATION DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND 
DEUTSCHEN RECHT 270-338 (1961). 
4. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 28-30, 39-57 (dis9ussing English reforms); 2 J. HAMEL, 
G. LAGARDE & A. JAUFFRET, DROIT COMMERCIAL 1-16 (G. Lagarde 2d ed. 1980) (French); 1 
H. WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: GRUNDLAGEN 24-34 (1980) (German). 
5. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
213-315 (1976) (as to the U.S.); 2 LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES: GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS (K. Hopt ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited 
as Hopt] (as to Germany, England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and the European 
Communities); F. WOOLDRIDGE, GROUPS OF COMPANIES (1981) (as to Britain, France, and 
Germany). 
6. On the historical development of the transnational enterprise, see the series of contribu-
tions in Multinational Enterprises, 48 Bus. HIST. REV. 277-446 (1974); see also Hawrylyshyn, 
The Internationalization of Firms, 5 J.W.T.L. 72 (1971). On the legal policy problems, see B. 
GROSSFELD, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS: RECHTS-
PROBLEME MULTINATIONALER UNTERNEHMEN (1975); Tune, Multi-national Companies in 
French Law, in LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FESTSCHRIFT FUR SCHMITTHOFF 375 
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several European states are very conscious of the corporate governance 
problem, but their responses to it have been dissimilar. 
B. The IJ!fferent Reform Strategies in European States 
European states appear disillusioned with attempts at achieving better 
corporate governance through increased shareholder democracy.7 This is 
hardly surprising, since, apart from the problem of the lack of sophistica-
tion exhibited by a broad stratum of the shareholding public, the cost-bene-
fit balance for small shareholders of investing more effort in participation 
and control is clearly negative. 
Furthermore, although several European states have posited the need 
for fundamental corporate law reform, 8 the likelihood of achieving any-
thing more than piecemeal reform remains speculative. Although an excep-
tion is found in Switzerland, where revision of the corporation law is going 
on slowly but steadily,9 Switzerland's unique tradition in the area of corpo-
rate governance explains this departure from the norm. 10 Thus, in the ab-
sence of convincing designs for new corporation law, most European states 
experiment with rather concrete reform strategies, and in the process exhibit 
their different theoreticiil' views of the corporate governance problem. 
When grouped according to the control mechanisms chosen, the most 
common of these reform strategies is to enhance use of the liability device. 
The immediate targets of this device are management and the board of di-
rectors. In most European countries, the duties and liabilities of manage-
(Fabricius ed. 1973); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational 
Law, 83 HAR.v. L. REV. 739 (1969). 
7. See, e.g., H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 352-53; see also M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, 
at 19, 56-63 (as to the U.S.). 
8. As to Great Britain, see L. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (1982) (The 
Gower Report was produced by a commission set up under the Secretary of State for Trade to 
advise on the need for new legislation.). As to Germany, see the report of the Enterprise Law 
Commission, a group set up by the Federal Ministry of Justice: BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER 
JUSTIZ, BERICHT UBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DER UNTERNEHMENSRECHTSKOMMISSION 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as the Enterprise Law Co=ission Report]. The Enterprise Law 
Commission worked from 1972 until 1979, producing a report of over 1000 pages. However, 
because it was composed of members of various factions and interest groups, it has remained 
divided over nearly every major problem. For a critical evaluation of its work, see Kubler, 
Unternehmensorganisation zwischen Sachverstand und Jnteressenpolitik, 10 ZGR 377-92 (1981). 
Total revisions of the corporate law have been enacted in Germany in 1965, in France in 1966, 
and in the Netherlands in 1970-1971. 
9. Botschaft Uber die Revision des Aktienrechts vom 23. Feb. 1983, No. 83.015. This draft 
law on the corporation (26th title of the Swiss Code on Obligations dating from 1936) contains 
only those proposals that are considered indispensable, other proposals being postponed. 
Some of the major targets of the draft law include investor protection, better disclosure, clearer 
delineation of the competences and tasks of corporate organs, especially the board and audi-
tors (Revisionsstelle), and corporate capital requirements. 
In Belgium, a draft law on co=ercial companies was presented to the Parliament on 
December 5, 1979, and is still under consideration by that body. See Lempereur, The Belgian 
Bill to Amend the Corporation Law- New Perspectives for Belgian Securities Regulation, 5 J, 
COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 195 (1983). 
l 0. In the context of merger control, see Schluep, The Swiss A ct on Cartels and The Practice 
of the Swiss Cartel Commission Concerning Economic Concentration, in I LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 123 (K, 
Hopt. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as I EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL]. 
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ment and the board are continuously refined by courts through legal 
doctrine. France and Belgium, however, have developed the "action en 
comblement du passif," 11 which can be brought against directors of a bank-
rupt corporation who, if found to have acted negligently, may be held per-
sonally liable not only for specific damages, but for all or part of the 
corporate deficit. The philosophy behind this action is that the privilege of 
incorporation with limited liability is not without bounds, and that the real 
corporate actors should be required under certain conditions to back up 
their actions with their personal wealth.12 
A more general reform strategy may be discerned in the new and in-
tense focus on the functions of the corporate board. 13 It is well known in 
Europe that the corporate board does not live up to the legislature's expec-
tations with respect to the board's supervision and control of the corpora-
tion's management. 14 Thus, the attempt is being made to activate this 
controlling function by giving boards greater rights to information from 
management, 15 by discarding or mitigating the temptations of self-inter-
est 16 and by imposing legal liability on directors.17 
Not only is the corporate board's controlling function being revitalized 
but attention has turned as well to those ''who control the tontrollers." This 
attention has led to the imposition of liability on auditors and banks. In 
11. See Art. 99 of the French Act No. 67-563 of July 13, 1967 J.O. 7059, 7065, 1982 D.S.L. 
269, 275; see also B. MERCADAL & P. JANIN, SOCIETES CoMMERCIALES (MEMENTO PRATIQUE 
FRANCIS LEFEBVRE), 1981-1982, at 928-31 (12th ed. 1981) (Nos. 3848-55: obligations des 
dirigeants au paiement du passifsocial) (French case law). For Belgium, see van O=eslaghe, 
Les groupes de societes et !'experience du droit beige, in Hopt, supra note 5, at 59, 92-94. 
12. For the historical developments concerning this philosophy, see L. GOWER, supra note 
3, at 43-57 (England). For an analy~is of the outer bounds of limited liability in modem 
corporation law, see H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 217-36. 
13. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 15-18, 29-30, 
113-16, 166-73, 429,449 (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds. 1984) (papers to the International Collo-
quium in Florence, Apr. 13-16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; Papers 
to the Congress on Corporate Governance, Paris, Mar. 9-11, 1983 (forthcoming). 
14. In Germany, with its obligatory division between management board and supervisory 
board, this had already been discussed extensively by the tum of the century. See A. CAHN, 
DER AUFSICHTSRAT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 249-64 (1907). The development of the su-
pervisory board in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is treated by Hopt, Zur Funk-
tion des Aufsichtsrats im Verhiiltnis von lndustrie und Bankensystem, in N. Hom & J. Kocka, 
supra note 1, at 227. For Great Britain, see Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate 
Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 20-32. Cf. A. CHANDLER, JR., 
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); M. 
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971) (for the United States). 
15. See, e.g., M. LUTTER, INFORMATION UNO VERTRAULICHKEIT IM AUFSICHTSRAT 
(Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europiiischen Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 25, 
1979); Mertens, Zur Berichtspjlicht des Vorstands gegenilber dem Aufsichtsrat, 25 AG 67 (1980). 
As regards the flow of information to the board and the role of the accountant, see M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 5, at 186-211. 
16. See K. Hopt, Se!f-Dea!ing and the Use of Corporate Opportunity and Information: Reg-
ulating Directors' Co'!flicts of Interest, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 285-326 
(Europe); Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998 
(1981). 
17. In this regard, see the Schajfgotsch decision of the German Federal Court Judgment of 
December 21, 1979. Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 33 NJW (Vol. 2) 1629 (1980); cf. Ulmer, 
Aufsichtsratsmandat und lnteressenkollision, 33 NJW (Vol. 2) 1603 (1980). 
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Switzerland, a new body of case law holds corporate auditors liable in cases 
of malfeasance. Is And in Germany, where banks traditionally play a key 
role in the corporate proxy machinery and on corporate boards, this role is 
being bolstered by the imposition of legal duties and liabilities on banks 
and bank representatives in various corporate contexts. 19 This is quite un-
like what the United States attempted to do with the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which was designed to negate the role of banks on corporate boards.2° For 
Germany, it is safe to say that traditional corporate law and governance 
cannot be understood without knowledge of the developments in banking 
law. On the whole, however, none of these measures solve the problem of 
corporate governance. 
Taking into consideration the phenomenon of director ineffectiveness, 
which in part seems but an outgrowth of the broader phenomena of organi-
zational slack and bureaucratic inefficiency,2 I some European countries 
have turned to the market to find a control mechanism. The market for 
corporate control, which provides such a check,22 has thus become the ob-
ject of regulatory concern in Great Britain, France, and Belgium. These 
countries have delineated the rights and duties of the participants in corpo-
rate takeovers, which are now supervised by state or self-regulatory bod-
ies. 23 Germany, however, has not witnessed such a development: in 
Germany, takeovers in general, let alone unfriendly ones, do not play a 
18. In particular, see the decision of the Swiss Federal Court. Judgment of Sept. 23, 1980, 
106 BG II 232, summarized in 70 DIE PRAXIS DES BUNDESGERICHTS 68 (1981); see also Forst-
moser, The .Duties and Liabilities of Auditors under Swiss Law, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. 
L. 305 (1983). For Germany, see w. EBKE, WJRTSCHAFTSPROFER UNO DRITIHAFTUNO 
(Schriften zum Deutschen und Europl!ischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht No. 95, 1983). 
For the United States, see Pitt & Williams, The Convergence of Commercial and Investment 
Banking: New .Directions in the Financial Services Industry, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 
137 (1983). The system of all-purpose banking that is practiced in Germany, Switzerland, and 
other countries has been the object of scrutiny as to its economic and legal implications. The 
results of this scrutiny favor such a system so long as legal safeguards are maintained. GER-
MAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BERICHT DER STUDIENKOMMISSION "GRUNDSATZ-
FRAGEN DER KREDITWJRTSCHAFT" (1979) (Banking Law Study Commission). 
19. Examples of such contexts include use of the banks' depository vote; conflicts of inter-
est of bank representatives on corporate boards; prospectus liability of banks; piercing the 
corporate veil in the event of bank participation; fiduciary duties of banks to shareholder-
clients; and the duties and liabilities of banks involved with failing companies. See, e.g., Zeit-
schr!fl far dos gesamte Hande/srecht und Wirtscheftsrecht, 147 ZHR 165-222 (1983); 145 ZHR 
177-272 (1981); 143 ZHR 113-226 (1979) (contributions to three Banking Law Symposia). 
20. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (codified at various 
sections of 12 U.S.C., including 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 335, 377 & 378) (1982). 
21. See J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 36-82 (1958); H. MINTZBERO, THE 
STRUCTURING OF 0RGANIZA TJONS 372-79 (1979) ( discussing problems of coordination, discre-
tion, and innovation, and the danger of dysfunctional responses). 
22. To what degree it does so in reality is open to question. Available evidence shows that 
quite often financially healthy enterprises are the target of tender offers. Furthermore, all real 
markets are imperfect, and these imperfections are especially marked for capital markets in 
Europe. See EEC COMMISSION, DER AUFBAU EINES EUROPAISCHEN KAPITALMARKTS (1966) 
(Segre report). 
23. See C. SCHMITTHOFF, F. GORE & T. HEINSIUS, DBERNAHMEANGEBOTE IM AK-
TIENRE~HT (Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung No. 77, 1976) (takeover bids); Immenga, Ojfenl• 
fiche l.fbernahmeangebote (Take over Bids), 41 Schw. AG 89 (1975); cf. Behrens, 
Rechtspolitische Grundsatzjragen zu einer Europiiischen Regelung jlir l.fbernahmeangebote, 4 
ZGR 433 (1975) (European harmonization). 
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major role.24 
More generally, since capital markets can also act as a check against 
inefficient corporate management by, for example, making corporate and 
credit relations with banks more difficult, these markets have become the 
object of regulation by laws and ongoing scrutiny by capital market com-
missions. Again, this is the case in France, Belgium, and, in a more compli-
cated and self-regulatory fashion, Great Britain. In Germany, capital 
market law is less developed and there is no body other than the stock ex-
changes in charge of supervising the capital markets.25 However, Germany 
has been the first to realize the significance of the relationship between cor-
porate power and antitrust law, particularly merger control, by using anti-
trust law to control transnational enterprises.26 
Improving corporate governance through market forces is, of course, 
problematic. Unresolved questions include how to develop such market 
forces if they do not yet exist or work satisfactorily;27 what is the right mix 
between state regulation and self-regulation for these markets;28 and how 
state-controlled corporations, groups of companies, and transnational en-
terprises can be effectively exposed to such market forces.29 
At any rate, there is widespread conviction in Europe that these and 
other means of controlling the performance of corporate managers and 
board members - such as the use of contingent salary mechanisms, premi-
ums, and stock bonuses - do not solve the problem, even though they may 
be steps in the right direction.30 This conviction has contributed to the will-
ingness of various European states to experiment with labor representation 
on corporate boards. Indeed, the idea of worker co-determination on the 
board is widespread and has even reached a stage in which the European 
Communities are considering making such co-determination obligatory in 
one way or another for all member states. This movement finds its rough 
24. In Germany, there are only nonbinding guidelines, which were reco=ended by the 
Stock Exchange Experts Co=ission in January 1979. For the text and (short) commentary, 
see BAUMBACH, DUDEN, & HOPT, HANDELSGESETZBUCH MIT NEBENGESETZEN (OHNE SEE-
RECHT) 1059-63 (25th ed. 1983). 
25. See F. KOBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 365-75 (1981); Hopt, Vom Aktien- und Bor-
senrecht zum Kapitalmarktrecht?, 141 ZHR 389 (1977); Kohl & Walz, Kapitalmarktrecht als 
Atifgabe, 22 AG 29 (1977). 
26. See Hopt, Merger Control in Germany, in l EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL, supra note 
IO, at 71. 
27. See Kubler, Unternehmensstruktur und Kapitalmarktfunktion - ifberlegungen zur Krise 
der Aktiengese!lscheft, 26 AG 5 (1981). 
28. See L. GOWER, supra note 8, ~~ 8.10-8.27 (self-regulatory agencies). In continental 
European countries, especially Germany, the attitude towards complete self-regulation is basi-
cally negative, such as in the context of insider regulation. 
29. Each of these organizations exhibits a strong tendency to insulate itself from outside 
control, whether by markets or by law. In state-controlled corporations, this insulation stems 
from the lack of responsiveness to financial pressures. In groups of companies, the specific 
corporate structure facilitates insulation, while in transnational enterprises, the territoriality 
principle and the differentials of nation-state regulation contribute to insulation from outside 
control. 
30. See Baellwieser & Schmidt, Unternehmensverfassung, Unternehmensziele und 
Finanztheorie, in UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG ALS PROBLEM DER BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTS-
LEHRE 645, 662-77 (K. Bohr, J. Drukarczyk, H.-J. Dru= & G. Scherrer eds. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as K. Bohr]. 
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equivalent in the trend in the United States toward the appointment of 
outside directors.31 Both movements are characterized by high hopes, con-
trasted with an overall evaluation so far that may dampen these hopes. 
Before turning to such an evaluation of the European movement, however, 
this Article shall outline the most recent developments in corporate gover-
nance in the European Communities. 
C. Harmonizing Corporate Governance Rules in the European 
Communities: The 1983 Draft of the F(fth Directive 
After a sluggish fifteen-year period, the harmonization movement in 
European company law gained momentum in the late 1970's. Already, six 
company law directives based on article 54(3)(g) of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty have been enacted by the Council and are bind-
ing on Member States. The core of the harmonization work concerning 
company structure is contained in the draft Fifth Directive. The original 
version of the draft presented by the European Commission in 197232 led to 
great controversy in the European Parliament and in the Member States 
because of its proposals on an obligatory two-tiered board, labor co-deter-
mination, and other issues. After ten years of deliberation, however, the 
European Parliament gave its opinion33 and the European Commission re-
sponded quickly by presenting an extensively revised draft Fifth Directive 
in 1983.34 
The 1983 draft focuses only on stock corporations, where transnational 
activities are predominant. For Member States like Germany, where other 
company forms compete very successfully with the stock corporation,35 this 
31. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 144-46, 174-77; E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 30-48, 
281-83; Brudney, The Independent IJirector-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 597 (1981). 
32. Commission Directive, Proposit!on d'une cinquieme directive tendant a coordonner Jes 
garanties qui sont exigees dans Jes Etats membres, des societes, au sens de !'article 58 
paragraphe 2 du traite, pour proteger Jes interets, tant des associes que des tiers en ce qui 
concerne la structure des societes anonymes ainsi que Jes pouvoirs et obligations de Jeurs or-
ganes, art. 58, 15 J. 0. COMM. EuR. (No. C 131) 49 (Dec. 13, 1972). For reviews in English, see 
Lang, The F!fth EEC IJirective on the Harmonization of Company Law(pts. 1-2), 12 CoM. MKT. 
L. REV. 155, 345 (1975); Conlon, Industrial IJemocracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of 
the IJrq/i F!fth IJireclive, 24 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 348 (1975). 
33. European Parliament Minutes of Proceedings of May 11, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. CoMr,f, 
(No. C 149) 12, 20-43 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as European Parliament). 
34. Commission Preparatory Act, Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on Ar-
ticle 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and the 
powers and obligations of their organs, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (Sept. 9, 1983) 
[hereinafter referred to as draft Fifth Directive]. For a first comment in German, see 
Kolvenbach, IJie Flinfle EG-Richtlinie iiber die Struktur der Aktiengesel/scl1q/i (Struktur-
richtlinie), 36 DER BETRIEB 2235-41 (1983). 
35. In Germany, there are 2140 stock corporations, of which some 450 have their shares 
quoted at the stock exchange, while there are 300,000 limited liability companies (GmbH, as of 
1984). See IJer Aktienmarkl in der Bundesrepubik IJeutsch/and und Seine Entwick/ungs Mog-
/ichkeiten, MONATSBERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN BUNDESBANK, Apr. 1984, at 12-21. 
The number of partnerships with a limited liability company as the only fully liable part· 
ner (GmbH & Co) is not recorded. On the resulting regulatory problems, compare Kilbler, 
supra note 27, with Schmidt, Mehr Unternehmen an die Borse durch dllferenzierle Mark/or-
ganisation in 1981 HANSEATISCHE WERTPAPIERBORSE HAMBURG 4 (Annual Report of the 
Hamburg Stock Exchange). 
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restriction tends to widen the regulatory gap that exists between the differ-
ent company forms and to intensify the movement away from the stock 
corporation. Thus, the danger exists that the harmonization envisaged by 
the draft Fifth Directive, which applies only to segments of the real enter-
prise world, may give rise to complacency.36 After all, regulatory goals 
such as investor and creditor protection and management responsibility do 
not lose their importance when an enterprise leaves the corporate form or 
chooses another form from the start. In terms of the European theoretical 
discussion, the slogan "from corporate law to enterprise law"37 reflects this 
concern. 
The European Commission has exhibited a clear preference for the Ger-
man two-tier board system, not only because it appears to bolster the super-
visory function in general, but also because the two-tier board is a much 
easier target for the varying co-determination formulas.38 Yet the Commis-
sion understood that it could not successfully promote its 1972 proposal of 
an obligatory separation between a management board and a supervisory 
board. Thus, the 1983 draft contains a compromise. The dual system is 
introduced as a general rule, but each Member State may opt for a unitary 
board system. This arrangement lasts for only five years, at which time the 
Commission is to evaluate the system and decide whether further harmoni-
zation will be necessary. Given the realities of the present decisionmaking 
process in the Commission, however, such a possible revision may be little 
more than a face-saving provision for the Commission. 
As a result, the draft contains elements of separation even for the op-
tional unitary board system. Managing and nonmanaging members of the 
unitary board must be distinguished. Managing members are to be ap-
pointed by nonmanaging members, and the number of nonmanaging mem-
bers must be higher than that of managing members. All this is designed to 
prepare the way for labor co-determination. Even the obligatory nomina-
tion of a member of the management board as the member who is primarily 
responsible for labor relations is maintained under the unitary board sys-
tem: this so-called labor director (Arbeitsdirektor) must be a managing 
member of the unitary board. Member States that currently use a unitary 
board system will undoubtedly realize that under these circumstances their 
option to continue such a system under the Fifth Directive is little more 
than nominal, and will react accordingly. In practice, however, the accep-
tance of the proposed reforms would result in less radical change than one 
watching this harmonization struggle might expect, since in many large cor-
porations the unitary board acts much like a supervisory board vis-a-vis 
management.39 
36. This danger has become real with the Fourth Directive Concerning Disclosure and 
Balance Sheets, which does not reach the German GmbH & Co., see note 35 supra, even 
though GmbH and GmbH & Co. are company forms that are in many ways equivalent alter-
natives for business. The German legislature does not intend to apply the Fourth Directive to 
GmbH & Co., even though the resulting discrepancies are quite arbitrary. 
37. Cf Enterprise Law Co=ission Report, supra note 8. 
38. Co-determina!ion can be confined to the supervisory board, the functions of which are 
undetermined, see note 14 supra, but which in any case do not include the whole range of 
entrepreneurial decisionmaking in the corporation. 
39. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 71 (England); E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 30-48, 52. 
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The other main controversy under the 1972 draft was labor co-determi-
nation.40 In this battlefield the Commission was forced to acknowledge the 
political realities confronting its Member States and sound the retreat. 
Thus, the draft provides for labor co-determination on the following terms: 
The threshold for obligatory labor co-determination is a work force of 1000 
or more employed within the same group of companies. Member States 
may provide that the majority of the workers of the corporation can vote 
against co-determination. This option is modeled after similar solutions in 
Scandinavia and Great Britain and has been on the list of requests by the 
European Parliament. If such a veto of the workers is not expressed, four 
possible models of co-determination may be prescribed by the Member 
States: 
(1) Selection of at least one-third, but no more than one-half, of the 
members of the supervisory board by labor. In the latter case ultimate deci-
sionmaking power must lie with the representatives chosen by the general 
assembly. This is necessary to make this model compatible with the Ger-
man Constitution.41 Member States may also provide that no more than 
one-third of the board members can be elected other than by the general 
assembly or the workers, leaving open the possibility of a third group of 
public-interest directors or state representatives, like that which exists in 
certain French state enterprises, most recently in those enterprises national-
ized in 1982.42 
(2) Co-optation of new members by the supervisory board itself. In this 
case, the general assembly and the work council have the right to appeal to 
an independent state-appointed body. This model is a near total imitation 
of the Dutch co-determination system.43 
(3) Informing and deliberating with a separate labor representation 
body within the corporation. This model has received attention in the 
British reform debate44 and has parallels in Norwegian corporation 
40. For a comparative law inventory as well as a critical appreciation of the different co-
determination models and their difficulties, see Hopt, Grundprobleme der Mitbeslimmung in 
Europa, 13 ZFA 207 (1982); Westermann, Tendenzen der gegenwarligen Mitbeslimmungsdiskus-
sion in der Europaischen Gemeinschqft, 48 RABELSZ 123 (1984) 
41. See Judgment of Mar. I, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 50 BYerfG 290, reprinted in 
32 NJW 699 (1979). For a summary of this decision, see 28 AM. J, COMP. L. 88 (1980) and the 
critical comment by Wiedemann, Codeterminalion by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM, 
J. COMP. L. 79 (1980). For a much more positive view, see Simitis, Workers' Participation in 
the Enterprise - Transcending Company Law?, 38 Moo. L. REV, I (1975). Most observers 
today would say that one can live with the German Codetermination Act of 1976 and with the 
Court's decision upholding it. See Part III i'!fra. 
42. Blanc-Jouvan, La participation des lravailleurs a la geslion des en/reprises en droil fran-
fais, in MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER IN FRANKREICH, GROSSBRITANNIEN, 
ScHWEDEN, ITALIEN, DEN U.S.A. UNO DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 33, 54 (Arbeiten 
zur Rechtsvergleichung No. 92, 1978); Loi de nationalisation (no. 82-155 du l1 fevrier 1982), 
art. 7, 1982 J.O. 566, 567, 1982 D.S.L. 92, 92. 
43. As to the Dutch Codetermination Act of 1971, see Sanders, Employee Participation in 
the Netherlands, 1977 J. Bus. L. 209. As to experiences with the Act, see Honee & De Groot, 
The Appointment of Supervisory .Directors in Major Companies (Report in Dutch) (1979) (Sum-
mary in English) (Social and Economic Council, 's-Gravenhage 1979); Honee, Erfahrungen mil 
der Koop/a/ion von Aef.richlsralsmitgliedern in den Niederlanden, 11 ZGR 87 (1982). 
44. See INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, CMD. 6706 
(1977) (Bullock Report); Kahn-Freund, Industrial .Democracy, 6 INDUS. L.J. 65 (1977); Davies, 
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law.45 
(4) Introduction of co-determination either within or outside of the 
board under terms that are the result of collective bargaining. Such a sys-
tem is in force in Sweden46 and has had a strong appeal to the partisans of 
labor co-determination in England. 
From the compromises reached regarding two main areas of contention, 
to wit, the propriety of a two-board system and of labor co-determination, 
one might conclude that even if the draft is adopted by the Council, which 
is hard to predict, the ambitious goal of European harmonization of com-
pany structure will be reached only to a modest degree. Yet such a conclu-
sion is superficial for several reasons. 
First, there exist many areas, such as the ambit of the general assembly 
and the rights of shareholders, on which harmonization without hedging 
will be reached. It is true that most of these areas are less conspicuous and 
of a more technical nature than the propriety of a two-board system or of 
co-determination, but corporate governance is reached only by a full con-
figuration of many protective devices. 
Second, one can hardly expect harmonization to be reached in a single 
leap. Not surprisingly, company law harmonization shares the fate of Eu-
ropean integration in general.47 The European Commission has favored 
the only sensible route, taking the European bull by the horns and narrow-
ing the options as far as possible: politics, after all, is the art of the possible. 
Third, and most important, even a full harmonization of company law 
and labor co-determination on the board would not ensure harmonization 
of behavior, decisionmaking processes, and the locus of responsibility 
within the corporation. Transplanting legal devices and institutions from 
one country to another and from one socioeconomic context to another is 
social experimentation with all its attendant uncertainties. This general ob-
servation applies with great force in the field of labor relations and co-de-
termination.48 Indeed, full harmonization as planned in 1972 might lead to 
less real homogeneity than that proposed in 1983, since in some countries 
trade unions that are oriented towards conflict and class struggle in the 
Marxian tradition may use co-determination in quite a different spirit than, 
The Bullock Report and Employee Participation in Corporate Planning in the lJ.K, I J. COMP. 
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 245 (1978). 
45. See Kolvenbach, supra note 34, at 2239. 
46. See F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1977). For a rather 
critical opinion, see Victorin, Co-determination in Sweden: the Union Way, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. 
& SEC. REG. 111 (1979). The most recent study is by economists E. Gerum & H. Steinmann, 
Unternehmensordnung und tarifvertragliche Mitbestimmung in Schweden - Ein Beitrag zur 
vergleichenden Unternehmensverfassungsforschung aus sozioakonomischer Sicht, 2 vols. (text 
and materials) (DFG-Abschlussbericht Ste 97 /9, Mar. 1983) (report available from the Ger-
man Science Foundation). 
47. See generally R. BUXBAUM & K. HOPT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (forthcoming) (contribution to the Florence Project on 
European Integration in the light of the "American Federal Experience") (directed by M. Cap-
pelletti) (discussing the harmonization of company and capital market law). 
48. See Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative 
Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 367-68, 391-92 (1980). 
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for example, the German trade unions, which have been very successful 
with co-determination. 
II. THE MANY ROADS TO "INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY": POLITICAL 
CROSSROADS TO WORKER CO-DETERMINATION 
A. Basic Strategies of Enhancing Labor's Influence on the Corporation 
In European countries labor's influence on corporations has grown 
steadily since World War I. This growth has not followed any logical se-
quence, since the development of labor representation on corporate boards 
has not occurred as a result of rational decision, but rather through a pro-
cess of political assertion and, compromise. One must take into account the 
institutional framework within which such boardroom co-determination 
has developed.49 
The main source of labor influence on the corporation has been collec-
tive bargaining. The preeminence of this mechanism remains unquestioned 
even when other devices such as boardroom co-determination are requested 
or obtained by labor. This does not, however, preclude conflicts between 
collective bargaining and boardroom co-determination.50 Indeed, the for-
mer is basically an adversarial strategy which includes such tools as strikes 
and lockouts, while the latter can succeed only if practiced with a sense of 
cooperation. It is precisely because of this conflict that boardroom co-de-
termination has been denounced by some as the last trick of capitalism. On 
the other hand, the scope of collective bargaining - the main, but by no 
means exclusive, object of which is to fix wages - may expand if, as in 
Sweden, it extends to various forms of co-determination within the enter-
prise and within the board.51 
More important than the body of law in this area are the traditions, 
behavior, and goals of the trade unions in a particular European country. 
Just as European and American trade unions are purported to be com-
pletely different, trade unions within the European Community vary widely 
in character.52 
Work councils are found in most European countries. These councils 
49. For the historical development of co-determination in Germany from the early nine-
teenth century until today, see MITBESTIMMUNG: URSPRUNGE UNO ENTWICKLUNG (Zeit-
schrift filr Unternehmensgeschichte Beiheft No. 19) (H. Pohl ed. 1981). For the socioeconomic 
background in England, see Wedderburn, supra note 14. For a very sharp comparative study 
of the institutional framework of worker participation in the United States and West Ger-
many, see Su=ers, supra note 48. For Sweden, see F. SCHMIDT, supra note 46. Cf. INDUS• 
TRIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (IDE), INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (1981) (comparing the worker participation schemes in twelve coun-
tries); INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (IDE) INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, EU-
ROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1981) (describing the various legal and socioeconomic 
factors relevant to a comparison of the twelve countries studied). 
50. See Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Po-
tentials, 4 J. COMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 163-67 (1982). 
51. For the ensuing, highly difficult problem of reconciling corporation law and these col-
lective agreements, see Victorin, supra note 46, at 130-33. 
52. See Wedderburn, supra note 14, at 19. 
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are usually imposed by law, but may also be formed voluntarily.53 They 
are geared towards increasing the participation of workers at the plant level 
in shaping the workplace environment. Accordingly, participation is organ-
ized from the bottom up, that is, at the shop-floor level. The participatory 
rights of these work councils vary greatly. Depending on the country, work 
councils range from the merely informational, to councils with obligatory 
consultation and co-deliberation rights, and finally, to councils with full 
participation rights and a veto in decisionmaking. Again, conflicts between 
collective bargaining and work council participation exist, but they are usu-
ally mitigated by the legal priority of the former. 54 
Labor participation from below implies at least indirect influence on the 
level above, and decisions at the plant level ultimately affect the social and 
economic policy of the enterprise as such. This observation, and the thrust 
of the participation movement in the last decade, justify the conclusion that 
participation necessarily transcends the plant level and plays a role in co-
determining enterprise policy.55 Short of outright board room co-determi-
nation, such participation at the enterprise level may be practiced within a 
system that fosters strategic informational exchange and consultation with 
labor. 
The organization and extent of this participation differ widely. In Ger-
many, the economic committee of the workers must be informed in a timely 
and thorough manner about a wide range of economic matters, such as the 
economic and financial situation of the enterprise, the production and in-
vestments program, changes in the organization, and other plans that could 
vitally affect the employees' interests.56 In Sweden, similar rights are given 
to the trade unions in order to promote "informed bargaining."57 In 
France, the "comite d'entreprise" has recently obtained not only the right to 
full information about the enterprise and its economic prospects but also 
the right to present requests to and consult with the board.58 Also, Euro-
pean countries are presently engaged in heated discussion concerning the 
far-reaching information rights to be granted to the workers in transna-
tional enterprises, particularly those working in subsidiaries with foreign 
parents.59 
53. Examples are given by Kubler, .Dual Loyalty of Labor Representatives, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 431; Simitis, supra note 41, at 3-4. 
54. For comprehensive legal information on many countries, see W. KoLVENBACH, EM-
PLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978). For an empirical study on the practice 
under the German work council system, see H.U. NIEDENHOFF, PRAXIS DER BETRIEBLICHEN 
MITBESTIMMUNG (1979). 
55. See Simitis, supra note 41, at 7. 
56. See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz arts. 106-111, 1972 BGBl I, pt. 1, at 13, 34-36 (W. Ger.). 
For an English translation and commentary, see M. PELTZER & R. BOER, BETRIEBSVERFAS-
SUNGSGESETZ/LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 240-59 (2d. ed. 1977). 
57. See E. GERUM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 54-56; if. L. GOWER, supra note 3, 
at 68-69 (England). 
58. See Loi no. 82-915 du 28 cictobre 1982 relative au developpement des institutions re-
presentatives du personnel, art. 29, 1982 J.O. 3255, 3263, 1982 D.S.L. 456, 463 (inserted into 
the labor code art. 432-5 (new)); if. Viandier, La loi no. 82-915 du 28 octobre 1982 et le droit 
des societes, 1983 J.C.P. I No. 25, at 3116 (ed. generale). 
59. This is the so-called Vredeling-Proposal of the European Commission. See Commis-
sion Proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employ-
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These strategies combine with and culminate in labor representation on 
the corporate board. Sometimes such labor representation on the board is 
characterized as a German experiment. Yet, while it is true that this system 
is most entrenched in Germany, various degrees of and formulas for worker 
representation on corporate boards have been instituted in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland.60 In 1982, France 
took a step in the same direction.61 Thus, labor representation on the cor-
porate board can be fairly described as a European movement. Of course, 
all these systems are instituted or at least supported by appropriate legisla-
tion, in stark contrast to the American case where Chrysler and the United 
Automobile Workers (UAW) simply appointed UAW President Douglas 
Fraser to the Chrysler board.62 
B. Trade Union Representation on Corporate Boards 
One of the major problems of co-determination stems from the natural 
antagonism between the trade unions, on the one hand, and the workers 
and their bodies, on the other hand, that exists in the single enterprise or 
plant. The development of work councils illustrates this phenomenon.63 
Employers have not always resisted the temptation to play work councils off 
against trade unions. And trade unions themselves have often opposed the 
development of a work council system, or at least a system that did not 
incorporate their interests. For example, English trade unions were clearly 
opposed to any kind of work council outside the trade union machinery, 
while in Germany the work council system could be built up only after the 
unions decided to use the work councils as their outposts in the plant. In 
fact, in Germany eighty percent of council members and nearly all work 
council chairmen today are union members. 
The process of instituting boardroom co-determination has displayed 
this very same tension.64 In Germany, boardroom co-determination was 
ees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings, 23 O.J. 
EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (Nov. 15, 1980). See also Birk, Unterrichtung und Anhonmg der 
Arbeitnehmer in transnationa!en Unternehmen, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, EUROPARECHT UND 
STAATENINTEGRATION: GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR LEONTIN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO 33 (G, 
L0ke, G. Ress & M. Will eds. 1983); Vandamme, L'ieformation et la consultation des trm•ail-
leurs dans la proposition de directive sur !es entreprises a structure complexe, en particulier trans• 
nationale, 24 REV. MARCHE COMM. 368 (1981). 
The European Parliament has recommended extensive modifications to this draft directive. 
The European Commission has responded with a modified draft. See Commission Amend-
ment to the proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting em-
ployees, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (Aug. 12, 1983) [hereinafter referred to as 
European Commission]. This new draft is commented upon by Westermann, supra note 40, at 
169-79. For a complete documentation, see R. BLANPAIN, F. BLANQUET, F. HERMAN & A. 
MoUTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL (1983); q: the critique in L'INFORMATJON ET LA CON· 
SULTATION DES TRAVAILLEURS DANS LES ENTREPRJSES MULTINATIONALES (J. Vandamme ed. 
1984). 
60. See Hopt, supra note 40; see also Symposium: Worker Participation in Management, 4 
COMP, L. Y.B. 3-163 (1981) (information on nine countries). 
61. See notes 42 and 58 supra. 
62. See Summers, supra note 50, at 155-56. 
63. See L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 68-69 (England); H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 4, at 587-
88 (Germany). 
64. The development of German legislation in the area of union representation is briefly 
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possible only because union representatives obtained up to one-third of the 
workers' seats. As a consequence, German labor is represented by at least 
some professional spokesmen who will look beyond short-term enterprise 
interests to broader and more long-term work force and union interests. In 
1983, for example, seventy-five percent of all labor directors were members 
of unions belonging to the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, and eight per-
cent belonged to the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft. Thus, German 
unions have assumed a role in the enterprise whereby they take a certain 
responsibility for the enterprise and its workers. 
Direct union representation is difficult, however, if, unlike in Germany, 
a large part of the work force is not unionized or there are many competing 
unions in a single enterprise.65 Furthermore, both organization theory and 
union practices show that the unions themselves do not always have a free 
and democratic structure.66 This problem led the European Commission to 
prescribe certain minimum standards for unions in its draft Fifth Direc-
tive. 67 Antagonisms between different layers of the work force, antago-
nisms between white-collar and blue-collar workers, and antagonisms 
between executives with managerial tasks and the rest of the work force, 
illustrate the difficulties here. In Germany, these difficulties have been re-
solved in the 1976 Co-determination Act by guaranteeing at least one seat 
on the board to executives, while taking into account the interests of wage-
earning and salaried employees through the voting procedure. 68 
C. The Parity Problem 
Organizing labor representation on corporate boards involves many 
political decisions, as is illustrated by the options made available to the 
Member States by the 1983 draft Fifth Directive. It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to compare in depth the unitary system with the two-tier board 
system, or the experiences of the Germa~ election model with those of the 
Dutch co-optation model.69 However, this Article shall address briefly 
described in P. HANAU & P. ULMER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ § 7 No. 32-37 (1981). For 
English developments, see L. GOWER, supra note 3, at 74-75. 
65. Direct union representation is still possible in such a situation. See, e.g., Summers, 
supra note 50, at 160-63 (United States). 
66. For Germany, see R. MICHELS, ZUR SozJOLOGIE DES PARTEIWESENS IN DER 
MODERNEN DEMOKRATIE (Krllners Taschenausgabe No. 250, 2d ed. 1970); H. STINDT, 
VERFASSUNGSGEBOT UND WIRKLICHKEIT DEMOKRATISCHER ORGANISATION DER GEWERK-
SCHAFTEN (1976); see generally BEITRAGE ZUR SOZJOLOGIE DER GEWERKSCHAFTEN (1979). 
For the United States, see Summers, supra note 48, at 385-91. 
67. Art. 4(i) of the 1983 draft Fifth Directive requires the Member States to respect the 
following principles: (a) labor representatives must be elected in a proportional representation 
scheme with specific protection for minorities; (b) all workers must have the chance to partici-
pate in the elections; (c) elections must be secret; (d) free expression of one's opinion must be 
granted. See draft Fifth Directive, supra note 34, at 10. 
68. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] art. 15(2), 1976 BGBI, pt. I, at 1153, I 157 (W. 
Ger.) (1976 Codetermination Act). The Act was pushed through by the liberal Free Demo-
crats in the face of protest by the trade unions, which perceived the Act as threatening to the 
homogeneity of labor. The Act has been justified by the idea that all three factors-capital, 
labor, and disposition-are to be represented. The rule has made it necessary to alleviate the 
strict incompatibility between management and supervisory board membership. 
69. See notes 39, 40 & 43 supra. 
1352 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1338 
what has been the most controversial policy issue of boardroom co-determi-
nation in Germany, to wit, the parity problem. 
The parity problem has been approached on three different levels. The 
first is a philosophical one, and raises questions of what risks workers bear 
within the corporation and what kind of influence corresponds to such risk-
bearing. Two opposing answers have been posited. According to one view, 
the shareholders bear the entrepreneurial risk and therefore should have 
the influence. According to another view, since the workers bear the risk of 
losing their jobs, they are members of the company to a far greater extent 
than the shareholders and deserve the lion's share of influence within the 
corporation. 70 
A second level of the parity problem is legal-political. This level in-
volves questions of what degree of influence in the corporation can be 
achieved in the political arena, how the resulting compromise may be codi-
fied, and whether such law is compatible with the country's constitution.71 
A third level of the parity problem involves issues such as how share-
holders, management, and workers behave under a parity model; what eco-
nomic and societal effects various models of underparity, parity, and 
overparity may have; and whether the uncertainties involved in answering 
such questions favor boardroom co-determination. The first attempts to ad-
dress this level were made in Germany in 1970 by the BiedenkopfCommis-
sion; this attempt was based on the Commission's extensive use of 
questionnaires and hearings concerning experiences with the full-parity 
German coal and steel co-determination.72 Since the late 1970's, a growing 
body of experiences with the quasi-parity co-determination under the 1976 
Act has become available.73 Some of the most recent contributions are 
made either by economists or by those writing with a socioeconomic per-
spective on the law.74 
70. The first view is the conventional one. For the second view, see, e.g., L. GOWER, supra 
note 3, at 10-11; Jonsson, Labour as Risk Bearer, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 373 (1978); Summers, 
supra note 50, at 170. 
71. This corresponds to most of the discussion led in Germany before the 1976 
Codetermination Act and until the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979. See 
note 41 supra. In the meantime (1984) German unions continue to ask for full parity and in 
some socialist-governed German states, as for example Hamburg, they will get it on a volun-
tary basis in all state companies. 
72. See Mitbestimmungskommission, Mitbestimmung im Untemehmen: Bericht der 
Sachverst!!ndigenkommission zur Auswertung der bisherigen Erfahrungen bei der Mitbestim-
mung (1970) [hereinafter ''The Biedenkopf Report"]. 
73. See, e.g., MITBESTIMMUNG UNO EFFIZIENZ (F. J. S!!cker & E. Zander eds. 1981). 
74. See generally K. Bohr, supra note 30; R. WICKENKAMP, UNTERNEHMENSMITBESTIM-
MUNG UNO VERFUGUNGSRECHTE (1983); G!!fgen, Zur vo/kswirtschafilichen Beurteilung der 
Entscheidungstei/nahme in Unternehmungen: Die deutsche Mithestimmungsregelung als Beispiel, 
in H. STEINMANN, G. GXFGEN & W. BLOMEYER, DIE KOSTEN DER MITDESTIMMUNO 9 (Ge-
sellschaft, Recht, Wirtschaft No. 5, 1981); EIGENTUMSRECHTE UNO PARTIZIPATION (J, 
Backhaus & H.G. Nutzinger eds.) (Frankfurter Abhandlungen zu den gesamten Staatswissen-
schaften No. 2, 1982). 
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III. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF LABOR 
REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD: MYTH, HOPE OR REALITY? 
A. Intra-Enterprise Effects 
1353 
Labor representation on corporate boards that is mandated by law in-
volves a choice of governance. Judging the impact of this choice is an un-
certain and inexact "science." Thus, although lately implementation 
research has become a major interdisciplinary effort, it has taught us to be 
aware of methodological pitfalls and to dampen our expectations.75 Still, 
legislators and lawyers must act in the face of uncertainty, while welcoming 
whatever certainty may be gleaned from experience. In this field direct 
causal relationships seldom exist, and the evaluation of specific decisions is 
difficult. But it seems that, at least, impact tendencies are recognizable and, 
even under the line of extreme retreat marked by van Hayek, that pattern 
predictions are possible. Thus, it makes sense to discuss what players 
should participate, and how to set the game or the market.76 This also ap-
plies to the task completion ability of alternative corporate governance 
structures77 and to labor co-determination through which new actors are 
introduced into the corporate board.78 
Within the corporation, a first and rather obvious impact of labor repre-
sentation on the board is the creation of an additional layer of control both 
on the supervisory board and on management. In contrast to outside direc-
tors in the United States, who characteristically play a pai,sive role as in-
vited guests "tied to the inside hosts by some sort of personal or business 
relationship,"79 the worker-directors belong to different social strata and 
have experienced a different socialization process than their co-directors. 
In addition, worker-directors are on the board by their own right, as repre-
sentatives of the work force, and through the union, to which they feel loy-
alty and by which they are controlled.80 Union representatives are usually 
professionals like the other members on the board, while nonunion labor 
15. See generally l IMPLEMENTATION POLITISCHER PROGRAMME, (R. Mayntz ed. 1980) 
(Empirische Forschungsberichte); 2 IMPLEMENTATION POLITISCHER PROGRAMME (R. Mayntz 
ed. 1983) (Ansl!tze zur Theoriebildung). For a recent survey of German contributions, see 
Reese, Implementationsforschung, 1982 SOZIOLOGISCHE REVUE 4, 37-44. 
For labor co-determination, see especially Gl!fgen, supra note 74, at 9-11, 14-19; Stein-
mann, Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse der Mithestimmung?, in H. STEINMANN, G. GXFGEN & W. 
BLOMEYER, supra note 74, at 39. 
16. See F. VON HAYEK, DIE THEORIE KOMPLEXER PHANOMENE (Vortrl!ge und Aufsl!tze 
No. 36, 1972); F. VON HAYEK, Die Anmassung von Wissen, 26 ORDO 12-21 (1975). 
11. See Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, A/tributes, 19 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1537 (1981 ); see also Comment, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Repre-
sentation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 919 (1982) (attempting to apply 
Williamson's approach to labor co-determination). 
78. The following observations relate primarily to the large modem corporation under the 
system of full parity (with a neutral eleventh board member) in the German coal and steel 
industry, and under the general system of quasi-parity (i.e., representatives of the shareholders 
having the last say by means of a double vote of the chairman of the board) under the 1976 
Co-determination Act. A complex institutional framework is thereby assumed as a given. See 
Part II supra. 
79. E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 48. 
80. There are instances in which a labor representative on the board has been considered a 
renegade and has been harassed by the unions and the press as a result of this branding. 
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representatives typically are not, compensating for their lack of professional 
training with full-time devotion, training provided by the unions, and the 
experience they have garnered at the grassroots level of the enterprise. Ad-
ditional compensation is not an important motivating force for these 
worker-directors, mainly because the unions have persuaded their members 
to keep only a basic amount of their compensation and tum the excess over 
to a union foundation. Status, influence, and career chances within the la-
bor movement are more powerful incentives for serving as a worker-
director. 
The worker-directors' monitoring function is facilitated by information 
flows to which nonworker directors are not privy. This information ema-
nates from the work councils, to which many worker-directors belong, and 
from the unions, to which most worker-directors belong even if they were 
not elected as union representatives. Of course, even if obstructionary tac-
tics such as denying full and equal access to committee work are blocked, as 
was recently done by the German courts,81 this merely means an improved 
possibility of monitoring by worker-directors. 
Co-determination has clearly had an impact on board decisionmaking, 
transforming and slowing down the whole process. A substantial number of 
shareholders and board members asked by the Biedenkopf Commission 
deemed this to be a significant disadvantage of co-determination. 82 While 
these complaints were made in the context of the full-parity coal and steel 
co-determination approach, the impact under the quasi-parity system is no 
different since, much to the chagrin of the nonworker board members, the 
worker representatives have overwhelmingly chosen to act as a clique under 
this system. Thus, even under the quasi-parity system, the decision-making 
process is complicated by the need for counter-fractionalizing, prior ar-
rangements, separate meetings, adjournments, and group bargaining. And 
although most decisions made by the supervisory board require careful de-
liberation, co-determination has contributed to the growing bureaucratiza-
tion of the whole decision-making process, with its well-known spillover 
effects.83 This slowdown and bureaucratization of the board's decision-
making process is thus one negative effect of co-determination to be 
weighed against the possible informational and motivational gains achieved 
through worker representation on the board.84 
The effect of co-determination on the substantive decisions made by the 
board is less clear, but certain tendencies can be observed. Co-determina-
tion has led to greater consideration of the societal impact of enterprise 
decisions. Decisions concerning new investments, cutbacks or shutdowns of 
works, geographical transfer of works, and other changes in the organiza-
81. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83 BGHZ 106; Judgment of Feb. 25, 
1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83 BGHZ 144; Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 83 
BGHZ 151 (all W. Ger.). 
82. See The Biedenkopf Report, supra note 72, at pt. III, No. 32. In the Netherlands, a 
work council's complaint against a specific co-optation to the board was most often based on 
not having been left enough time to deliberate. See Hom~e, supra note 43, at 99. 
83. See Zander, Personalwirtschaflliche Konsequenzen der unternehmensverfassungsrechl-
lichen Mitbestimmung, in K. Bohr, supra note 30, at 309, 326-28; see also note 21 supra. 
84. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 24. 
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tion are acceptable for the labor representatives only if the social impact of 
these changes is taken into account.85 Thus, when Volkswagen planned to 
open a subsidiary in the United States, labor feared that this would fore-
close the creation of new jobs in Germany, or even lead to layoffs. As a 
result, the final decision was blocked for two years, and consent was finally 
given only in part and under the condition that there would be no layoffs in 
Germany for a certain period of time and that further investment in the 
United States would be subject to the prior consent of the board. Similar 
effects have been noted in the area of dividend distributions. The worker 
representatives on the board favor the retention of earnings rather than dis-
tribution to the shareholders, a position in which management concurs. 
This effect of co-determination reinforces the tendency of German enter-
prises to keep dividends at a fixed and relatively low level, instead of giving 
out varying dividends according to the year's business. Labor's concern 
with the societal impact of enterprise decisions should not be construed as a 
rejection of the profit motive, however. In fact, the Biedenkopf Report 
could point to no case in which the profit motive was abandoned by a board 
under the co-determination system.86 And although cutbacks and shut-
downs were delayed considerably, they were never finally blocked. 
Finally, co-determination has exhibited effects on management, which 
is nominated by the supervisory board. The shareholders' side rarely uses 
its second vote to get its candidate nominated, since this would lead to a 
deterioration of the cooperative climate within the enterprise and would 
make it difficult for the manager to fulfill his tasks. Instead, prior agree-
ment is nearly always sought and reached between capital and labor about 
new appointments. Sometimes the shareholders' side gets the representa-
tive of the executives with managerial tasks to favor their candidate, as in 
the recent appointment of the president of Daimler Benz, but even in such a 
case a formal split of the labor faction hardly ever occurs. As a matter of 
fact, the representatives of the executives with managerial tasks vote regu-
larly with the other worker-directors, with occasional exceptions when the 
above-mentioned Arbeitsdirektor is to be nominated. Such agreements be-
tween capital and labor have their price. In a number of cases, the candi-
date favored by labor is nominated. More significantly, the profile of 
management changes.87 New appointees must be acceptable to labor, who 
will examine their attitudes and their prior record toward labor. This im-
plies that top managers must attempt to establish and maintain good rela-
tions with labor if they want to be reelected in the same enterprise or to 
have a chance to be elected in another enterprise that is subject to union co-
determination. This effect of labor is even stronger on the member of the 
managing board who is in charge of social matters and labor relations (the 
Arbeitsdirektor), especially if the unions obtain veto power over this post.88 
Whether the increased influence of labor under a system of co-determi-
85. See The Biedenkopf Report, supra note 72, at pt. III, Nos. 33-53. 
86. Id at pt. Ill, No. 36. See generally D. BRINKMANN-HERZ, ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZESSE 
IN DEN AUFSICHTSRATEN DER MONTANINDUSTRIE (1972); W. TEGTMEIER, WIRKUNGEN DER 
MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER (Wirtschaftspolitische Studien No. 30, 1973). 
87. For the Netherlands, see Honee, supra note 43, at 98-106, 107. 
88. See Zander, supra note 83, at 313-17. 
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nation results in a greater acceptance of board decisions by workers, and 
thereby has the effect of promoting intra-enterprise efficiency, 89 is not fully 
clear. While there is empirical evidence of a correlation between participa-
tion and worker motivation, this evidence relates to the more direct partici-
pation of the single worker at his particular work place or, at the most, in 
his plant.90 
B. Effects on Markets and the Economy 
Effects on markets and the economy from a system of co-determination 
are probable, but somewhat difficult to confirm and describe. Some conclu-
sions follow from observations of the intra-enterprise effects of labor co-
determination, while others are more speculative. 
To begin, however, the notion that co-determination mandated by law 
rather than by market forces is inefficient91 must be discarded. This notion 
not only ignores important _legal goals, but it fails to consider that although 
individual actors in the market may be efficient in minimizing their own 
transaction costs, they may also neglect externalities and the overall eco-
nomic consequences of their behavior.92 
The clearest effects of co-determination are on the capital markets. As 
previously noted, labor representatives on the board tend to reduce divi-
dend payments to shareholders and, insofar as they have any influence, 
favor higher salaries and social benefits for the workers. Furthermore, la-
bor representatives tend to slow down and weaken management decisions 
that may affect jobs and other labor interests. These effects are not without 
consequences on the valuation of the shares of the co-determined corpora-
tion, even though these consequences may be difficult to prove empirically. 
Even more important, however, shareholders will be reluctant to extend 
more capital to corporations with a co-determination system and will in-
stead look for other investments.93 Proposals to make the burden even for 
all companies within a state are of doubtful merit, since there is always the 
possibility of exporting one's capital abroad to a less regulated area. 
89. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 12, 19-20, 23; Steinmann, supra note 75, at 59-60; cf. 
Cable & FitzRoy, Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Participation: Some Prelimi-
nary Results for West Germany, 33 KYKLOS 100 (1980) (discussing voluntary participation be• 
low the board level). 
90. See G. Teubner, Co-Determination Through Law: Social Functions of Law in Institu-
tional Innovations 9-11 (European University Institute Paper, Florence 1982) (unpublished) 
("somewhat depressing findings"). 
91. See Furubotn, Codeterminalion and the Efficient Partitioning of Ownership Rights in the 
Firm, 137 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 702, 705 (1981); Jensen & 
Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application lo Labor-managed Firms and 
Codeterminalion, 52 J. Bus. 469,473 (1979); Pejovich, Codetermination: A New Perspective for 
the West, in THE CODETERMINATION MOVEMENT IN THE WEST 3, 16-20 (S. Pejovich ed. 1978). 
92. See Brinkmann & Kobler, Uber!egungen mr okonomischen Analyse von Unternehmens• 
rechl, 137 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 681, 683 (1981); Picot, J)er 
Beilrag der Theorie der Verjligungsrechte zur okonomischen Analyse von Unternehmungsverfas-
sungen, in K. Bohr, supra note 30, at 153, 168-69. Principal objections to the transaction cost 
approach in this context are voiced in I E. GER UM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 108-12 
("costs follow the constitution"). 
93. See, e.g., Engels, Arbeitsorientierle Unternehmensverfassung und Risikenmechanik, in K, 
Bohr, supra note 30, at 199, 212-18; Glifgen, supra note 74, at 28-30. 
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It has been alleged that co-determination will increase costs for labor 
(salary, social benefits, job security) that cannot be sufficiently offset by im-
proved efficiency, and that co-determination will thereby lead to competi-
tive disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign firms. It has also been claimed that 
necessary changes may be delayed, potential innovations reduced, and the 
dynamics of the economy affected.94 However, these dire prognoses lose 
some of their theoretical force when one considers that real markets are 
imperfect and leave management with considerable room for decisionmak-
ing. Profit maximization has long since given way to a full range of goals 
pursued by the management of the large corporation, profit being a general 
guideline only except in specific difficult situations when it becomes pivotal 
again. 
Furthermore, co-determination may have a number of positive effects 
on the economy. It may lead to decisionmaking, both inside the board and 
in the collective bargaining context, based on more information, which re-
sults in better decisions. Efficiency of production and economic allocation 
may thereby be enhanced. More important, however, co-determination is 
expected to reduce the level of conflict between capital and labor, to make 
unions more cooperative and responsive, and to reduce the economic losses 
that are caused by strikes and lockouts.95 The traditionally excellent Ger-
man record in avoiding strikes is sometimes cited to support this last expec-
tation. The German record, however, is due to many institutional and 
other factors, and cannot be used to prove the above hypotheses. Specifi-
cally, two factors are crucial to the German success story, to wit, the charac-
ter of the German trade union movement and the overall economic position 
of Germany. If these factors were to change - if, for example, German co-
determination were exported to a country with trade unions hostile to the 
system, or if co-determination were practiced during a serious and long-
lasting recession - the record might very well be quite different. 
C. Societal Effects 
Most difficult of all to ascertain are the societal effects that may be ex-
pected from co-determination. Differences in political and economic theory 
influence any evaluation of such societal effects. This problem in evalua-
tion is aptly illustrated by examining the antitrust concerns that co-determi-
nation has spawned. Thus, American observers of co-determination have 
voiced reservations about such a system because they fear its potential for 
anticompetitive effects through the presence of union members on many 
boards.96 Viewed from the German experience, which relies heavily on the 
94. See G. PROS!, V0LKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE AUSWIRKUNGEN DES MITBESTIMMUNGS-
GESETZES 1976 (1978) (This was an opinion mandated by the shareholder side in the proceed-
ings before the Federal Constitution Court. See note 41 supra.); Prosi, Milbeslimmung und 
Innovationen, in INN0VATIONSPR0BLEME IN OST UND WEST 115-21 (A. Schiiller, H. Leipold & 
H. Hamel eds. 1983) (Schriften zum Vergleich von Wirtschaftsordnungen No. 33). 
95. See Glifgen, supra note 74, at 18-19, 22-23; Summers, supra note 50, at 167, 168, 184; 
see also Picot, supra note 92, at 169 (at least in the short term no impairment of efficiency by 
co-determination, but this could possibly be due to extraneous factors). 
96. See Steuer, Employee Represenlalion on lhe Board: Industrial Democracy or lnlerlock-
ing Directorate?, 16 C0LUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 255, 270-74 (1977); Summers, supra note 50, at 
179-83. 
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societal and libertarian aspects of antitrust policy, this concern is over-
stated. While some scenarios of co-determination may imply such dangers, 
for example, a scenario in which unions constructed information systems 
about enterprises and used them on the boards of different enterprises in a 
collusive way,97 no such fears have been realized. Thus, at least at the mo-
ment, it is fair to say that the relationship between co-determination and 
antitrust does not present problems in Germany.98 
Other expectations of the societal effects of co-determination are con-
nected with two schools of thought that have been influential in postwar 
German legal theory and for which Habermas and Luhmann are the main 
proponents. The concept of industrial democracy, and labor's request that 
it be given representation and voting power on corporate boards, may be 
characterized as examples of the free dialogue ("herrschaftsfreier rational er 
Diskurs"). According to Habermas and the Francfort and Erlangen school 
of thought, this free dialogue, if led by equal partners in a constructive 
spirit, may be the only way to modem problem-solving in philosophy, as 
well as in government and in society.99 It would be too easy to dismiss this 
- as has been done in the philosophical debate - by merely pointing to 
the real world difficulties in creating the structural and motivational pre-
conditions for such a dialogue on free and equal terms. Some of these diffi-
culties have already been mentioned, and include questions as to the 
professional competence of both partners, the willingness to cooperate, the 
internal democracy of the employers' associations and trade unions, 
whether labor has enough financial support to qualify as an equal partner, 
and whether a hospitable economic and political situation exists for such a 
dialogue. Yet the idea that in modem society the need for consensus is 
growing, that conflicts between blocks of interests are best solved by dia-
logue and bargaining, has its appeal. Such problem solving may also ulti-
mately produce better overall economic effects. 
Clues as to the societal effects of co-determination are also provided by 
social systems theory. The economy and single large corporations are con-
ceived of as (sub)systems with a· relatively large degree of independence. 
Systems theory as applied to the enterprise sector can draw upon the fact 
that markets, as well as state intervention, fail to fulfill the governing and 
steering functions that are conventionally attributed to them. One way out 
of this dilemma may be to make the systems themselves responsive to other 
and more general needs than their own, by organizing them in a way that 
makes the pursuit of outside interests possible and even probable. In this 
sense, co-determination is an instrument of societal steering by decentral-
ized systems organization.100 Again, it would be easy to dismiss this ap-
97. See Hopt, supra note 40, at 229. 
98. See P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, at Einleitung no. 7. 
99. See especially Steinmann, supra note 75, at 46-48 (discussing the philosophical sources 
of co-determination); Steinmann, 17ze Enterprise as Political System, in CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE, supra note 13, at 402-05; Gl!fgen, supra note 74, at 34-35; see also H. STEINMANN & E. 
GERUM, REFORM DER UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG: METHODISCHE UND OKONOMJSCHE 
GRUNDOBERLEGUNGEN (Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europl!ischen Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht No. 33, 1978) (addressing the philosophical sources of enterprise law in 
general). 
100. See G. Teubner, infra note 105, at 160-64 (specific reference to Luhmann). See gener• 
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proach philosophically, as well as in its application to co-determination. 
Indeed, the theory may be formulated in such generic terms as to make it 
meaningless for practical problems, or even worse, so as to hide choices and 
value judgments in seemingly neutral language. Yet the concept of decen-
tralized steering, that is, setting up a framework for corporate organization 
and decisionmaking such as co-determination, cannot be easily dismissed. 
The challenge to such decentralized steering lies less in the many problems 
with all alternative steering instruments, but rather in such a system's reli-
ance on structural and procedural control mechanisms101 and in its poten-
tial for delegalization. 102 The crucial question remains, of course, whether 
performances that in classical theory have been attributed only to markets 
can also be claimed for forms of enterprise organization. The evolution of 
the modern corporation seems to give an affirmative answer, if one agrees 
that leaving certain economic activities to the market place or internalizing 
them in an intra-enterprise or intra-group structure has not been the result 
of historical coincidence, but rather of economic choice and 
performance.103 
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, BOARD SECRECY, AND OTHER LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 
A. Recognizing Co'!flicting Loyalties 
Through the political and socioeconomic decision to mandate labor rep-
resentation on corporate boards, national legislatures install the players and 
set up the game. Writing the rules of the game in detail, and rendering 
them compatible with other fields, is left to the lawyers and the courts. The 
body of such rules is growing fast, and is the focus of attention of both 
enterprises and of that part of the legal and academic profession addressing 
co-determination issues. 104 The overwhelming impression garnered from 
the German and other European experiences is that, contrary to what is 
sometimes believed in the United States, problems arising from labor repre-
sentation on corporate boards, such as conflicts of interest and threats to 
board secrecy, are difficult but resolvable. 
ally Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 11 LAW & Socv. Rev. 239 
(1983). 
IOI. On this point, many participants of the Florence colloquium on corporate govern-
ance, see note 13 supra, seem to agree. See Wedderburn, supra note 14, at 44; G. TEUBNER, 
supra note 90, at 166-72; Hopt, supra note 13, at 315-20; Kobler, supra note 53, at 439-41; and 
Steinmann, supra note 99, at 422-25; see generally Simon, From Substantive lo Procedural Ra-
tionality, in METHOD AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 129 (S. Latsis ed. 1976); Ballwieser & 
Schmidt, supra note 30, at 677. 
102. See generally Galanter, Legality and its Discontents: A Preliminary Assessment ef Cur-
ren/ Theories o/ Legalization and lJelega/izalion, in ALTERNATIVE RECHTSFORMEN UND AL-
TERNATIVEN ZUM RECHT J J (6 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE J J 
(1980)); see also H. ZACHER, s. SIMITIS, F. KOBLER, K. HoPT & G. TEUBNER, Verrechtlichung 
von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Sozialer Solidaritlit (1984) (symposium, Bonn, Sept. 21-24, 1983). 
103. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 77. 
104. For information about the struggle between German enterprise and unions over these 
rules even after the affirmative decisions of the Federal Constitution Court, see sources cited in 
note 41 supra;seealso Hopt, supra note 40, at 224-26. For details about the state of the law, see 
P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64. 
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The most obvious legal problem arising from co-determination is the 
conflict of interest that it creates for labor directors. The conventional wis-
dom of traditional corporate law was that board members owed loyalty 
only to the corporation and, directly or indirectly, to the shareholders. This 
conventional wisdom never reflected the reality of large corporations, how-
ever. Indeed, there is a long history in Germany of the broadening of this 
traditional concept to include other corporate goals and beneficiaries of cor-
porate fiduciary duties. 105 Under co-determination the standard formula 
used to prescribe the object of the board member's duty of loyalty is the 
interest of the enterprise, whatever that may be. Opinions of what is en-
compassed by the interest of the enterprise range from strict profit max-
imization, to long-term profit optimization with wide discretion in the 
board, and finally, to the explicit inclusion of external goals and interests. 
The same controversies that were observed with respect to the effects of co-
determination on markets and the economy apply as well to the duty of 
loyalty. Thus, while there are those who want to subject management and 
the board to the strict control of profit and market forces, the reality of 
imperfect markets and undisputed discretion in corporate decisionmaking 
seems to argue against this position. 
Although much of the discussion of the conflicting loyalties of worker 
board members lies within the realm of legal theory, practical answers are 
needed to some important questions. For example, may a labor director 
participate in decisions of the board relating to wage policy, social matters, 
and industrial relations and conflicts? Or may the union member who sits 
on the board actively join or even organize strikes and other measures 
against the enterprise? In some jurisdictions, such as Denmark and Ireland, 
legislation provides that they may do neither. In others, the delineation 
between the permissible and the impermissible is extremely controver-
sial.106 Compromise solutions, such as allowing labor directors to deliber-
ate but not to participate in a final vote, or limiting union members to 
passive participation in strikes, have been offered. If expectations of the 
economic and societal benefits of co-determination are translated into legal 
rules, these solutions are hardly convincing. The conflicting loyalties of the 
105. For a short survey in English, see Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Per-
spectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 38-43 (1966) (changing the corporate pur-
pose). For a procedural approach, see sources cited in note IOI supra; see also A. GROSSMANN, 
UNTERNEHMENSZIELE IM AKTIENRECHT (Abhandlungen zum deutschen und europllischen 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht No. 29, 1980); Laske, lnlerrehmensinleresse und Mitbestimmung, 
8 ZGR 173, 196-200 (1979); G. Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary .Duties and Tlzeir Beneficiaries: A 
Functional Approach lo the Legal Inslilulionalizalion of Corporate Responsibility, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 154-55. 
106. See P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, at§ 25, Nos. 27-28, 96-98; § 26, Nos. 19-25 
(containing different answers and further references); Kobler, supra note 53, at 432-38. For 
England, see the discussion between Kahn-Freund, supra note 44, at 76-77, and Davies & 
Wedderburn, The Land of Industrial .Democracy, 6 INous. L.J. 197, 200-02 (1977); see also L. 
GOWER, supra note 3, at 580. For the United States, see Note, Serving Two Masters: Union 
Representation on Corporate Boards of .Directors, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 639, 656-60 (1981); Sum-
mers, supra note 50, at 165, 169-71; Comment, supra note 77, at 954. Whether the worker-
director himself prefers to abstain or even suspend his participation in such matters is an alto-
gether different question. UAW President Fraser did just that while on the Chrylser board, as 
did the worker-directors in the German Arbed Saarstahl GmbH when drastic reorganization 
measures were required. 
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labor director have to be respected by not depriving him of his vote and by 
not forcing him to desert his fellow union members. Otherwise the faction-
alization of the board members is reinforced, and the functions of the union 
representative both on the board and in the union are impaired. 
B. Board Secrecy: D[!ferent Standards for Shareholders' and Workers' 
Representatives? 
Even more controversial than the conflicting loyalties of labor members 
of corporate boards is the issue of whether the traditional obligation of 
maintaining board secrecy applies equally to worker-directors. In Ger-
many, it is generally held that there cannot be different standards for share-
holders' and workers' representatives to the board. This is also the express 
position of the 1983 draft Fifth Directive.107 But while board secrecy is not 
much of a burden for the shareholders' representatives, 108 this is not true 
for worker representatives. 
Workers' representatives are expected by the work councils, the unions, 
and the work force of the enterprise to report on their participation on the 
board and the current problems facing the enterprise. These constituencies 
expect workers' representatives to express their interest in the board and to 
show that they are performing competently in their role. Even if such ex-
pectations are contrary to German law, where board secrecy is strictly up-
held and informing the work force may be exclusively a decision for the 
management board, 109 reality does not always correspond to this legal pic-
ture. There have been clear cases in which even highly sensitive informa-
tion, such as the planned sale of an unprofitable subsidiary to another 
group of companies, or plans and decisions as to cutbacks, shutdowns, and 
reorganization measures, has been released prematurely. 
Whether this gap between law and reality can be left open indefinitely is 
questionable. Approaches to a somewhat more flexible attitude can be dis-
cerned, however. In Germany, for example, important information inter-
ests of the work force have been characterized as part of the enterprise 
interest and therefore properly taken into account. This might lead to the 
conclusion that such information cannot be treated as secret, so that the 
information would thereby become disclosable without imposing different 
standards on shareholders' and workers' directors. Furthermore, a board 
member must be allowed to get expert advice if this is necessary to fulfill his 
function; 110 but if the expert is not bound by professional secrecy, the board 
107. See draft Fifth Directive, supra note 34, at 12. 
108. This does not mean that there are no conflicts of interest, but simply that the expecta-
tions of those who send the representative to the board, like banks, major business partners, 
lawyers, and other professionals, are usually different from labor. As to the difficult questions 
regarding the conflict of interest of the former, see Lutter, Bankenverlreler im Az!fsichtsral, 145 
ZHR 224 (1981) (Germany). For a comparative analysis, see note l supra. For the United 
States, see E. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 129-37, 283-89. 
109. As to the latter, see M. LUTIER, supra note 15, at 136. Bui see F.J. SACKER, lNFORMA-
TIONSRECHTE DER BETRIEBS- UNO AUFSICHTSRATSMITGLIEDER UND GEHEIMSPHARE DES UN-
TERNEHMENS 82 (Schriften des Betriebs-Beraters No. 60, 1979). See generally P. HANAU & P. 
ULMER, supra note 64, at§ 25, No. 99-115. 
110. See Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, 64 BGHZ 325, 331-32 (W. Ger.). 
But the individual labor representative does not have the right to take an outside expert with 
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member has the duty to oblige him contractually to keep the secret. These 
rules are important and should not be construed too narrowly, for if co-
determination is expected to have a positive economic impact by better in-
forming the unions and the work force, it would hardly make sense to im-
pede such an information flow with legal rules. 
The difficult task is, as always, the delineation of what is secret, because 
even though the need for secrecy is often exaggerated, every enterprise 
needs some inner secrecy beyond the mere withholding of industrial secrets 
to maintain strategic maneuverability. Sweden has come up with one inter-
esting alternative to legal rule making in this area. There, collective bar-
gaining may also extend to the question of what board matters shall be kept 
secret. 111 Under the German model, an equivalent procedural approach 
would be to leave the issue of confidentiality to the shareholders' and work-
ers' representatives on the board to discuss and decide, but then to make 
this board decision binding on all individual members. This approach 
seems to have been taken in doubtful cases by the co-determined boards in 
the coal and steel industry. 112 
C. Co-determination in Groups and Transnational Enterprises: Towards 
the Limits of Law 
Together, groups of corporations and transnational enterprises define 
modem corporate reality. Regulatory ideas and corporate governance con-
cepts meet their ultimate test with these entities. Corporate law has not yet 
come to grips with groups, and is even further away with transnational en-
terprises.113 This is the case for Germany, with its first codified law of 
groups, and for the United States, where the phenomenon of transnational 
enterprises was first observed and analyzed. Co-determination is plagued 
by this same inability of the law to keep pace with modem corporate real-
ity. Problems posed by this inability in the field of co-determination are 
quite challenging, but the scope of this Article permits only two final obser-
vations on the European scene.114 
First, the difficulty of installing co-determination in company groups 115 
consists in finding a solution that on the one hand gives the workers, includ-
ing those in the subsidiaries, effective influence on the parent corporation 
him when inspecting the auditors' report of which no personal copies are given out. See Judg-
ment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 85 BGHZ 293 (W. Ger.). 
111. See I E. GERUM & H. STEINMANN, supra note 46, at 146-48. 
112. See Enterprise Law Commission Report, supra note 8, at No. 477. There was com-
plete disagreement about the best solution to the board secrecy problem. Id. at Nos. 461-85. 
113. See sources cited in note 5 supra. 
114. For details, see the abundant German literature on art. 5 of the 1976 Co-determina-
tion Act (co-determination within the group of companies) and on the territorial reach of the 
Act. Some of it is recorded in P. HANAU & P. ULMER, supra note 64, vor § 5, vor § I. For 
some empirical data, see Gerum, Richter & Steinmann, Vnternehmenspolitik im mitbestimmten 
Konzern, 41 DIE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT 345-60 (1981) (condensed version in; K. Bohr, supra 
note 30, at 293-308). 
115. That is, parents with control over subsidiaries. Mere financial participation and ties 
do not suffice. Whether such control exists in the case of partially owned subsidiaries is as 
unclear here as elsewhere in corporate law. The difference is that here a complex co-determi-
nation structure depends on an answer to this question. 
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where the real decisions are made, and on the other hand does not impair 
the control of the parent over the subsidiaries. The German solution, giv-
ing all workers of the group a vote for co-determination on the board of the 
parent and at the same time co-determination in their subsidiary, has met 
with criticism. The difficulties are increased if the parent is not subject to 
co-determination, for example, because it is organized as a partnership with 
the personal liability of a natural person, or because it is a foreign corpora-
tion. The German rule of treating the next highest-ranking subsidiary as a 
fictitious parent for the purposes of co-determination (so-called Teilkon-
zem) has also been criticized by ~ost commentators. Similar difficulties 
have arisen in other European countries. 116 These problems have been 
considered so thorny that the European parliament has requested that most 
of the Fifth Directive should not be applied to groups. Moreover, the Euro-
pean Commission, while rightly refusing to dilute the directive in this way, 
has included in its 1983 draft an option for the Member States to postpone 
applying parts of the directive until the planned Ninth Directive on Harmo-
nization of the Law of Groups is enacted.117 
Installing effective co-determination in transnational enterprises is even 
more problematic than is the case with company groups. There are two sets 
of problems, one legal and one economic. The legal set is an outgrowth of 
the territoriality principle, and is a well-known problem facing other na-
tional regulatory strategies such as antitrust, securities regulation, and 
banking law. Beyond the usual conflicts oflaw rules, strategies to deal with 
this problem are the above-mentioned Teilkonzem in German law or the 
European Vredeling proposal. 118 Quite apart from these legal problems is 
the question whether national legislatures are ready to assume the risk of 
the possible economic consequences of a co-determination decision, to wit, 
the possible exodus of transnational enterprises from the country, or at least 
the strategic allocation of new foreign capital and new subsidiaries of the 
transnational enterprises to competing third countries. The Dutch legisla-
tors, fully resigned to this possibility, have granted transnational enterprises 
far-reaching exemptions from co-determination.119 The Germans, on the 
other hand, have not done so, and thus have taken the risk of moving ahead 
in the hope that the European Communities will follow. 
116. For the Netherlands, see Honee, supra note 43, at 93; van Veenroy, Konzernrecht und 
Mitbestimmung in den Niederlanden, 14 ZFA 121-40 (1983). For France, see Viandier, supra 
note 58. For Sweden, see Gerum & Steinmann, supra note 46, at 24, 135-43. 
117. See European Parliament, supra note 33, at 43 (art. 63(a)); draft Fifth Directive, supra 
note 34, at 36-37 (art. 63(b) and the reasons given for it). 
118. See European Commission, supra note 59. 
119. See Honee, supra note 43, at 92; Hopt, supra note 40, at 233-34 (perspectives for a 
European harmonization). 
